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Abstract
Continuum models are often used to study large nite assignment economies. However,
some subtleties must be taken into account. We show that in the large nite random assign-
ment problem without transfers, Competitive Equilibrium with vanishing income di¤erences
does not asymptotically characterize the set of e¢ cient and envy-free random assignment
proles. This is in sharp contrast with the continuum model counterpart (Ashlagi and Shi,
2015). The problem is driven by the failure of local non-satiation inherent in no-transfer
assignment.
Keywords: Random Assignments, E¢ ciency, Envy-freeness, Convergence Failure, Com-
petitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes.
1 Introduction
Since Aumanns (1964) pioneering work, it has been widely accepted that contin-
uum economies constitute a valid approximation to big economies where no single
agent can have an impact on general market conditions.1 Following the work of
Abdulkadiroglu, Che, and Yasuda (2015), Miralles (2008), Che and Kojima (2010),
and Azevedo and Leshno (2013), continuum models became the workhorse models
for analyzing large nite matching and assignment economies without transfers.
Their usefulness goes beyond theory and extends to recent advances in empirical
analysis of these markets (Agarwal and Somaini 2014, Calsamiglia, Fu and Güell,
2015).
We show that the use of the continuum models as approximations to large nite
assignment economies without transfers requires care. We demonstrate it by ex-
amining a natural question what assignment proles2 are e¢ cient and fair? in
large nite economies, and by showing that the answer is substantially di¤erent
Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Miralles), and University
of California Los Angeles (Pycia). We would like to thank Salvador Barberà, Jordi Massó, Moritz Meyer-ter-
Vehn, William Zame, and seminar participants at UCLA and UAB for helpful comments. Antonio Miralles
acknowledges nancial support from the Ramón y Cajal contract (RYC2011-09665) of the Spanish Government,
from the Spanish Plan Nacional I+D+I (ECO2014-53051-P), the Generalitat de Catalunya (SGR2014-505) and
the Severo Ochoa program (SEV-2015-0563).
1Continuum approximations o¤er many methodological advantages. For instance, the standard abuse of the
law of large numbers allows us to reduce complex stochastic problems to deterministic ones and the existence of
pure-strategy Nash equilibria is assured when the strategy space remains nite (Mas-Colell 1984).
2An assignment prole gives a lottery over objects to each agent.
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from the answer to the same question in the continuum economy limit. We study
economies in which each agent evaluates the utility from a random assignment in
line with the expected utility theory and we assume that each agent would like to
receive at most one object as in Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979). In the continuum
assignment economy limit, Ashlagi and Shi (2015) provided an elegant characteri-
zation of e¢ cient and fair assignment proles: in the full-support economies every
such assignment prole can be implemented in a competitive equilibrium with
equal incomes (CEEI); the CEEI mechanism has been rst studied in Hylland and
Zeckhausers seminal work.3
We show that this elegant characterization fails to be true, even approximately,
in large nite economies. To do so we study a sequence of growing nite assignment
economies that converge to a full-support continuum economy. In these economies,
we construct a sequence of e¢ cient and fair assignment proles that cannot be
supported by competitive equilibria in which agents budgets (or incomes) are
asymptotically equal.
The key to our counterexample is the failure of local non-satiation that is inher-
ent to Hylland and Zeckhausers assignment economies. In fact, in economies in
which agents are locally non-satiated Zhou (1992) shows that all fair and e¢ cient
allocations can be implemented via competitive equilibrium from equal incomes
not only in the continuum limit but also in large nite economies.4
To understand the role of satiation, we rst start at the limit continuum econ-
omy. FromAshlagi and Shi (2015) we know that any e¢ cient and envy-free random
assignment prole is the outcome of a CEEI. Now suppose that there is some ob-
ject whose equilibrium price is not zero yet it lies below individual income. Due
to a form of satiation inherent in random assignment economies, namely unit de-
mands, all agents who prefer this object over the others would purchase a sure
copy of it, hence not spending the whole budget. The gap between income and
agentsexpense is the basis of the failure of CEEI convergence in nite economies.
Going to nite economies, which are not dense in the preference space, we can
almost satiate all individuals who prefer the aforementioned object, so that they
do not envy other agents, even if there is a non-vanishing income gap between the
latter agents and the former agents. We can do so for any arbitrarily, yet not fully,
dense economy. That is why a converging sequence of growing nite economies,
3Thomson and Zhou (1993) have a similar characterization for assignment economies beyond unit demands.
This result does not extend to our model because they only consider individual allocations belonging to the
interior of the consumption space. In addition to Hylland and Zeckhauser, and Ashlagi and Shi, CEEI was
studied by, among others, Azevedo and Budish (2013) who proved that CEEI becomes incentive compatible in
large economies; Pycia (2011) who has shown that the CEEI assignment can be unboundedly more utilitarian-
e¢ cient than the best symmetric ordinal mechanism, and Hafalir and Miralles (2015) who have shown that
under some conditions the CEEI assignment is utilitarian- and Rawlsian-optimal among all incentive-compatible
assignment rules. Budish (2011) provided a deterministic approximation to CEEI, and Budish, Che, Kojima and
Milgrom (2013) extended CEEI to multi-unit assignment problems. We study fairness in the standard sense of
envy-free, see Foley (1967) and Kolm (1971).
4Zhou assumes that agents utilities are monotone, quasiconcave and di¤erentiable. His fairness concept is
strict envy-freeness, which is equivalent to envy-freeness in our setting. In general, an allocation is strict envy-free
if no agent envies the average bundle of a group of other agents. Zhou does not require agents to demand at most
one object.
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and a corresponding sequence of e¢ cient and envy-free random assignment proles
can be constructed such that none of them are respectively supported by a sequence
of competitive equilibria with income di¤erences converging to zero.
This line of reasoning should convince the reader that the counterexample we
nd is not a knife-edge case. In fact, for any CEEI in a limit continuum economy
with a¤ordable, yet not free, sure copies of objects, one could construct such a
sequence.
A natural follow-up question is whether there are other ways to restore the
intuition, that CEEI approximately characterizes in some sense the set of e¢ cient
and envy-free assignment proles in large nite economies. We provide an easy an-
swer. For any converging sequence of growing economies with their corresponding
e¢ cient and envy-free assignment proles, one can construct a parallel sequence of
economies by only slightly modifying the supply vectors, converging to the same
limit economy, such that a corresponding sequence of CEEI assignment proles
in the modied sequence yields asymptotically the same individual payo¤s as the
original sequence of assignment proles. This is what we call payo¤ convergence
under trembled supplies. As a corollary, we also show that the original sequence
of assignments could be obtained through almost-optimal consumer decisions in a
sort of quasi-CEEI.
Unfortunately, we cannot go beyond, in the sense of not needing a trembled
supply vector. We show that CEEI prices and payo¤s are not lower-hemicontinuous
in the supply vector. Consequently, one cannot simply ignore trembled supplies
and obtain a similar payo¤ convergence of CEEI in the original sequence.
Our note contributes to several strands of the literature. First, we provide
a warning that solutions obtained in the continuum model are not necessarily
indicative of solutions that would obtain in large nite economies. Second, by
showing that CEEI is not the only assignment mechanism that is both e¢ cient
and fair, our paper poses the question what mechanisms are both e¢ cient and fair
(or, nearly equivalently in large markets, e¢ cient and incentive compatible)?5 The
study of these mechanisms is a topic for further research.
Let us stress that in many problems the qualitative properties of continuum
economies do parallel those of large nite economies we are interested in. For
instance, the asymptotic equivalence of Random Priority and Probabilistic Serial
mechanisms (Che and Kojima 2010) and the uniqueness of asymptotically ordinally
e¢ cient, symmetric, and strategy-proof mechanisms (Liu and Pycia 2013) obtain
both in large nite and in continuum models.6
In more general economies, there is a rich literature shedding light on the
benets and shortcomings of working directly at limit economies. Roberts and
5We know from Miralles and Pycia (2014) that all such mechanisms can be described as competitive equilibria
from some prole of incomes; the open question is how to assign the incomes in a way that is fair or incentive
compatible.
6See also Miralles (2008) for an exploration of the continuum model. Beyond the no-transfer model we study,
the convergence results have been obtained by many authors. See, for instance, Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame (1992)
for a study of core convergence as the economy converges to the atomless housing assignment model with transfers.
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Postlewaite (1976) nd sequences of economies in which incentives to misreport
preferences do not asymptotically vanish as the economy grows larger. Manelli
(1991) constructs examples of sequences of increasingly large economies whose
core cannot be decentralized via prices (a so-called core convergence failure), when
preferences are not monotonic.7 Serrano, Vohra and Volij (2001) show that, un-
der asymmetric information, the core fails to converge to any sort of set of price
equilibrium outcomes in replica economies.
2 Model
We study an economy with agents i; j 2 I  [0; 1] and a nite, xed set of indivisible
objects x; y 2 X = f1; 2; :::; jXjg. I is endowed with a measure , and the total mass of
I is 1. We allow, yet not impose, I to be nite with jIj individuals, considered as jIj
di¤erent atoms on the [0; 1] interval with mass 1=jIj each. In such a case we say that
the economy is nite. When I = [0; 1],  is the Lebesgue (uniform) measure. Each
object x is represented by a mass of identical copies (or capacity) sx 2 (0; 1). By
S = (sx)x2X we denote the total supply of object copies in the economy. If agents
have outside options, we treat them as objects in X; in particular, this implies thatP
x2X sx  1.
We assume that agents demand at most one copy of an object. We allow
random assignments, and denote by qx(i) 2 [0; 1] the probability that agent i obtains
a copy of object x. Agent is random assignment (or simply assignment hereafter)
q(i) = (q1(i); :::; qjXj(i)) 2 jXj 1 is a probability distribution. The economy-wide
assignment, or assignment prole, q : I ! jXj 1 is feasible if R
I
q(i)d  S. Let
A denote the set of all possible assignment proles, and F  A denote the set of
feasible assignment proles.
Agents are expected utility maximizers, and agent is utility from assignment
q(i) equals the scalar product ui(q(i)) = v(i)  q(i) where v(i) = (vx(i))x2X is a vector of
agent is von Neumann-Morgenstern valuations for objects x 2 X. We assume that
no agent is indi¤erent among all objects.8 This allows us to normalize valuation
vectors so that each agents highest valuation is 1 and lowest is 0. Let V be the
space of all such normalized valuation vectors:
V = f(v1; :::; vjXj) 2 [0; 1]jXj j minfv1; :::; vjXjg = 0; maxfv1; :::; vjXjg = 1g:
A valuation prole is a function v : [0; 1]! V that is  measurable. An assignment
economy is a tuple E = (I; ;X; S; v).
An economy is "-dense if for any  2 V there is i 2 I with kv(i)  k  ".9 An
economy is dense if for every " > 0 the economy is " dense. Clearly, no economy
7See also Anderson and Zame (1997) who study core convergence when the set of goods is a continuum. They
show that Edgeworths conjecture that the core can be asymptotically decentralized through prices as the number
of agents increase is not always true.
8The assumption that no agent is indi¤erent among all objects is with no loss of generality. Such an agent
would not ever envy other agents since she would be satiated by any probability bundle. Since she is satiated, it
is easy to include her in any competitive equilibrium by endowing her with su¢ cient income.
9We use the Euclidean norm although results do not depend on this particular choice of norm.
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with nite I can be dense. An economy has full support if for all V  V with
dim(V ) = dim(V)10 we have (V ) > 0. Obviously all fully supported economies are
dense, yet the converse may not be true.
For an economy E = (I; ;X; S; v), a feasible random assignment q 2 F is Pareto
e¢ cient (or, simply, e¢ cient) if no other feasible assignment prole q 2 F is weakly
preferred by all agents and strictly preferred by a positive mass of agents. A feasible
random assignment q 2 F is envy-free if for every pair of agents i; j 2 I we have
ui(q
(i))  ui(q(j)).
An assignment prole q and a price vector p 2 RjXj+ constitute a competitive
equilibrium for a -measurable budget (or income) prole w : I ! R+ if q is
feasible, p  q(i)  w(i) for any i 2 I, and ui(q(i)) > ui(q(i)) =) p  q(i) > w(i) for
any q 2 A. In such a case we also say that q is supported by p and w. In a
competitive equilibrium with equal incomes (CEEI) we additionally require w to
be a constant function.
Notice that when all prices in p are equal then every agent obtains sure assign-
ment of her most preferred object. This case is straightforward, and in the sequel
we focus on the case in which not all prices are equal; this allows us to normalize
prices and budgets so that the highest price is 1 and the lowest price is 0.11 Let P
denote the set of all such normalized price vectors.
Sequences of economies and convergence. Let t = 1; 2; ::: A sequence of nite
economies Et = (It; t; X ; St; vt) is a growing sequence of economies if 8t; It  It+1
and 8i 2 It; vt+1(i) = vt(i). A growing sequence of nite economies is a converging
sequence of economies with limit E = (I; ;X ; S; v) if 8t; i 2 It we have vt(i) = v(i); and
both It ! I and St ! S: 12In such a growing sequence we use t(i) = minft : i 2 Itg for
the moment in which an agent is incorporated into the sequence of economies. An
assignment prole q corresponds to an economy E = (I; ;X ; S; v) if it gives a lottery
to each element of I and it is feasible. In a converging sequence of economies Et =
(It; t; X ; St; vt) with limit E = (I; ;X ; S; v), a sequence of corresponding assignment
proles qt payo¤-converges to q if for every i 2 I and for t  t(i); u(qt(i))! u(q(i)).13
3 The Failure of Convergence
Is it true that as the number of agents grow and the economy becomes denser, every
e¢ cient and envy-free assignment prole is supported by a competitive equilibrium
with arbitrarily similar incomes? This is indeed the case in the limit continuum
economy with full support of preferences. As implied by Ashlagi and Shi (2015),
10The dimension of V is the maximum dimension along all convex subsets of V .
11Let p = min
x2X
px < p = max
x2X
px.
P
x2X p
xqx  w implies that Px2X(px   p)qx  w   p (sinceP
x2X q
x = 1;) which in turn implies
P
x2X
px p
p p q
x  w p
p p : That justies the normalization p
0x = p
x p
p p
and w0 = min
n
w p
p p ; 1
o
:
12 It converges to I in the density sense: for any i 2 I and " > 0 there is t and some it 2 It such that ji  itj < ".
13We would also simply talk about convergence if qt(i) ! q(i): Obviously convergence implies pay-o¤ conver-
gence, while the converse may not be true.
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Figure 1: An e¢ cient and envy-free assignment prole that cannot be supported by CEEI.
in any full-support economy E = (I; ;X ; S; v) with a continuum of agents every
e¢ cient and envy-free assignment prole q can be supported by a CEEI.14
This natural result fails in nite economies. Not surprisingly, not every e¢ cient
and envy-free assignment prole can be supported by a CEEI in nite economies.
Figure 1 illustrates an assignment prole for the set of agents I = fi; i0; jg in the
simplex of all probabilistic assignments of objects fx; y; zg. The simplex is drawn so
that the top corner is the sure assignment of object x, the right corner represents
the sure assignment of object y, and the left corner represents the sure assignment
of object z. Individual assignments are q(i) = (3=4; 0; 1=4), q(i0) = (1=2; 1=2; 0) and
q(j) = (0; 3=4; 1=4). The supply vector such that this assignment prole is feasible:
S = [q(i)+q(i0)+q(j)]=3 = (5=12; 5=12; 1=6). Agents i and i0 are both indi¤erent between
each others assignment: v(i) = v(i0) = (1; 1=2; 0). Agent js valuation vector is v(j) =
(1=2; 1; 0), and the dashed line represents her indi¤erence curve. Arrows indicate the
direction towards which agents would be better-o¤. Notice that no agent envies
another agents assignment. This assignment prole is e¢ cient because the price
vector p = (1; 1=2; 0) supports this assignment prole in equilibrium. This price
vector is in fact the unique equilibrium price vector supporting this assignment
prole (according to our normalization); but at these prices agents i and i0 need
budget 34 (thin blue line) to buy their bundles while agent j must have the budget
of exactly 38 (thick red line.) Hence this e¢ cient and envy-free assignment prole
cannot be implemented by a CEEI.
This example leaves open the possibility that the CEEI characterization be-
comes nearly true in large economies. Our main result addresses this possibility.
Theorem 1. (CEEI Convergence Failure) There exists a limit economy E = (I; ;X; S; v)
and a converging sequence of growing "t-dense nite economies Et = (It; t; X ; St; vt)!
14Ashlagi and Shi (2015)s Theorem 1 says that in a full-support economy every e¢ cient, symmetric, and
incentive-compatible mechanism can be supported by a CEEI as long as changes of reports by a measure zero of
agents have no impact on the assignment of other agents. The results are related as under the latter assumption,
envy-freeness is equivalent to a conjunction of symmetry and incentive compatibility in any full support continuum
economy.
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E = (I; ;X; S; v), with "t ! 0 and E having full support on the preference space, and
a payo¤-converging sequence of corresponding e¢ cient and envy-free assignment
proles qt ! q (where q is an e¢ cient and envy-free assignment prole corre-
sponding to E) such that for every supporting corresponding sequence of equilib-
rium prices pt 2 P and income functions wt : It ! [0; 1] there exist ;  > 0 under
which t

i 2 It : max
j2It
wt (j)  wt (i)  

  for all t:
Proof: Let X = fx; y; zg. The limit economy E = (I; ;X; S; v) with I = [0; 1] and 
being the Lebesgue uniform measure. We describe our valuation prole v : I ! V
in Table 1:
i 2 ::: [0; 1=8] [1=8; 1=4] [1=4; 1=2] [1=2; 5=8] [5=8; 3=4] [3=4; 7=8] [7=8; 1]
vx(i) 1 1 1 5  8i 0 0 8i  7
vy(i) 0 4i  1=2 2i 1 1 7  8i 0
vz(i) 1  8i 0 0 0 8i  5 1 1
Table 1: Limit distribution of preferences.
Notice that v is continuous in i, and that the economy E has full support (and
hence it is dense) in V. Agents in [0; 1=4] prefer x the most and have a vNM
valuation for y below 1=2: Agent i = 1=4 (relevant in our example for the sake of
equilibrium uniqueness) has valuation v(i) = (1; 1=2; 0): Agents in (1=4; 1=2) prefer
object x and have valuation for y above 1/2. Agent i = 1=2 is indi¤erent between
objects x and y (notice that no nite economy in the sequence below contains this
agent.) Agents in (1=2; 3=4) prefer y to the other objects. Agents in [3=4; 1] have
object z as favorite object.
Tables 2a and 2b summarize an e¢ cient and envy-free assignment prole.
This assignment prole can be supported solely by the following CEEI: p =
(px; py; pz) = (1; 1=2; 0) and w = 3=4: Since everyone enjoys the same income, x
must be the most expensive object, since it is the only one that cannot be obtained
with certainty, thus px = 1. Now, agents in [0; 1=4) have to buy less probabilities
of the less preferred good (in this case z) than agents in (1=4; 1=2] do (in this case
object y). Recalling that everyone has the same income, it must be the case that z
is cheaper than y. Hence pz = 0. This sets income, w = 3=4 ; which is the one that
allows the latter agents to purchase the bundle (3=4; 0; 1=4) at these prices. This
in turn sets the price for object y; py = 1=2; the only one that allows agents in
(1=4; 1=2] to purchase the exact bundle (1=2; 1=2; 0):
i 2 ::: Lebesgue measure qx(i) qy(i) qz(i) pq(i) w(i)
[0; 1=4) 1/4 3/4 0 1/4 3/4 3/4
f1=4g 0 5/8 1/4 1/8 3/4 3/4
(1=4; 1=2] 1/4 1/2 1/2 0 3/4 3/4
(1=2; 3=4) 1/4 0 1 0 1/2 3/4
[3=4; 1] 1/4 0 0 1 0 3/4
Goods p S
x 1 5/16
y 1/2 3/8
z 0 5/16
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Table 2: a) an e¢ cient and envy-free assignment, with equilibrium expenses and
budgets, and b) prices and supply.
Importantly, not every agent needs her full income in order to a¤ord her assign-
ment. This is the key role of satiation: the most preferred bundle is not necessarily
on the hyperplane where expenses equal income. Thus, agents in (1=2; 3=4) could
have obtained their most-preferred assignment with income 1/2 instead of 3/4.
This gap is the basis of our sequence of nite economies, where these agents have
income slightly below 1/2.
We construct a sequence of growing nite economies Et = (It; t; X; St; vt) that
converges to the limit economy E. For t = 1; 2; ::: set
It =

1
4  3t ;
3
4  3t ; :::;
4  3t   3
4  3t ;
4  3t   1
4  3t

implying jItj = 2  3t. Let {^t = minfi 2 It : i  1=2g = 1=2 + 143t ; such that v(^{t) =
(1  2=3t; 1; 0) = (1  4=jItj; 1; 0) : This is the agent that has highest vNM valuation for
object x among those who prefer y over all other objects. Note as well that 1=4 2 I1,
and that It  It+1 for all t. For "t = 2=3t = 4=jItj  12 max
i2Itnf 12jItjg
v(i)  v i  1jItj
the economy Et is "t dense in V. We impose that for every t and i 2 It; vt(i) =
v(i): A payo¤-convergent sequence of e¢ cient and envy-free assignment proles is
summarized in Table 3, jointly with incomes and supply vectors. Only one vector
of prices p = (1; 1=2; 0) can sustain this assignment prole through a competitive
equilibrium, as we show below.
i 2 ::: Mass qxt (i) qyt (i) qzt (i) wt (i) lim
t!1w

t (i)
[0; 1=4) 1=4  12jItj 3/4 0 1/4 3/4 3/4
f1=4g 1=jItj 5/8 1/4 1/8 3/4 3/4
(1=4; 1=2] 1=4  12jItj 1/2 1/2 0 3/4 3/4
(1=2; 3=4) 1=4  12jItj 0 1  2=jItj 2=jItj 1=2  1=jItj 1/2
[3=4; 1] 1=4+ 12jItj 0 0 1 3/4 3/4
Goods pt= p St
x 1 5=16
y 1/2 3=8 

1  1jItj

1
jItj
z 0 5=16+

1  1jItj

1
jItj
Table 3: a) an e¢ cient and envy-free assignment along the sequence, with incomes
and limit incomes, and b) prices and supply along the sequence.
The assignment proles qt are e¢ cient and envy-free. E¢ ciency is implied by
the Hylland and Zeckhausers (1979) First Welfare Theorem because there is a
competitive equilibrium supporting it. The competitive equilibrium supporting qt
is constructed as follows. We set pt = v(1=4), that is, pxt = 1; p
y
t = 1=2 and pzt = 0;
t = 1; 2; ::: with incomes wt (i) = 1=2   1=jItj < 1=2 if i 2 (1=2; 3=4), and wt(i) = 3=4
otherwise.
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The price vector is the unique (normalized) equilibrium price vector since agent
i = 1=4s assigned lottery is in the interior of the consumption space: linear utilities
impose that i = 1=4 is indi¤erent among all the probability bundles that cost
the same in any competitive equilibrium. Given the uniqueness of pt , all agents
i 2 [0; 1=2]must have income 3/4. Agents in (1=2; 3=4)must have the assigned income
1=2   1=jItj to purchase their assigned bundles. Agents in [3=4; 1] are satiated with
any income, so without loss of generality we give them income 3/4.
To check envy-freeness note that the richest agents in each equilibrium, those
with income 3/4, cannot envy any other agents probability bundle (since it is
also a¤ordable with the highest income). Hence we just need to show that agents
i 2 (1=2; 3=4); who obtain expected utility 1  2=jItj; do not envy the richest agents.
Bundle (3=4; 0; 1=4) gives them payo¤ 3=4vx(i)  3=4vx(^{t)  3=4(1 4=jItj) = 3=4 3=jItj <
1   2=jItj so that bundle is not envied. Bundle (1=2; 1=2; 0) gives payo¤ v
x(i)+1
2 
vx({^t)+1
2 = 1   2=jItj thus that bundle is not envied either. Of course (5=8; 1=4; 1=8) is
a convex combination of the previous two bundles hence it is not envied either.
Finally, the bundle (0; 0; 1) is not envied either because these agents prefer y to z.
We complete the proof by setting the inmum income gap between poorer and
richer agents,  = 1=4; and the minimum mass of low-income agents along the
sequence,  = 1=4  12jI1j = 1=6. QED
Notice what happens in the limit economy to which the sequence Et converges
in our counterexample. In the limit economy, the agents who prefer y over other
objects obtain a sure copy of y, and hence we can increase their budget (or income)
without a¤ecting the equilibrium assignment; in particular, we can set their income
to be equal to everyone elses. This is not possible at any nite economy of the
sequence, no matter how close to the continuum limit it is. This observation
reconciles our construction with the work of Ashlagi and Shi (2015): The limit
assignment prole of the sequence is a CEEI assignment prole; yet no element of
the sequence is approximately CEEI.
The role of satiation. To understand the idea behind this result, we pay attention
to the unit demand constraint. In some sense, it is a satiation constraint. It could
be taken as if individuals were not willing to purchase higher quantities. Observe
that, with the same linear preferences yet ignoring the unit demand constraint, the
counterexample proving Theorem 1 would have failed.15 Agents i 2 (1=4; 1=2) in the
counterexample above would now optimally buy the bundle (0,3/2,0) instead of
(1/2,1/2,0). Agents who prefer y; with income below 1/2, would envy the former
agents. With satiation (unit demands), two agents with just slightly di¤erent
cardinal preferences yet di¤erent ordinal preferences could optimally choose very
di¤erent bundles even with equal incomes. Hence envy may not arise when income
di¤erences between these agents stay away from zero. Without satiation, and
unless both objects have the same price, di¤erences in ordinal preferences induce
no di¤erences in the optimal choice when incomes are equal. Non-vanishing income
di¤erences would unavoidably induce envy eventually as the economy gets denser.
15Obviously and to start with, pz = 0 would not be allowed in equilibrium. But even if we consider an economy
with goods x and y only (and ignoring the agents who preferred object z), the counterexample fails, as explained
in the main text.
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4 Discussion: Other Convergence Criteria
A natural question then is whether there is a di¤erent convergence notion that
restores the validity of CEEI in large markets. In this section we explore additional
convergence criteria under which CEEI could asymptotically characterize the set
of e¢ cient and envy-free assignment proles. Particularly we list the following
alternative approaches:
 Payo¤ convergence: there exists a sequence of CEEI assignment proles for
the same sequence of economies that payo¤-converges to the same limit as-
signment prole. CEEI would constitute a good approximation to the set of
payo¤s obtained under e¢ cient and envy-free assignment proles. A weak
version of payo¤ convergence allows the sequence of CEEI assignment pro-
les to correspond to a sequence of slightly modied economies with trembled
supplies, with this tremble converging to zero.
 Nearly-optimal-choice convergence: each element qt of the sequence of e¢ cient
and envy-free assignment proles is obtained through t optimal choices for
a vector of prices pt and the same income wt for every individual, with t  0
converging to 0. A choice qt (i) is t optimal given prices pt and income wt if
ui(q)  ui(qt (i)) > t implies pt  q > wt .
We start with a weak version of payo¤ convergence. A sequence of CEEI as-
signment proles payo¤-approaches any converging sequence of e¢ cient and envy-
free assignment proles if the supply vector is slightly trembled (and this tremble
converges to zero as the economy grows large). This in turns proves that nearly-
optimal-choice convergence restores the validity of CEEI in characterizing e¢ cient
and envy-free assignment proles in large economies.
Proposition 1 (CEEI Payo¤Convergence under Trembling Supplies) Let Et = (It; t; X
; St; vt); t = 1; 2; ::: be a converging sequence of "t dense economies with full-
support dense limit economy E = (I; ;X ; S; v), and let us have a sequence
of corresponding e¢ cient and envy-free assignment proles qt that payo¤-
converges to q, an e¢ cient and envy-free assignment prole corresponding
to E. Then there is a parallel converging sequence of economies Et = (It; t; X
;t; vt) identical to Et in all except for the supply vector, and with t St ! 0,
such that there is a corresponding sequence of CEEI assignment proles qceeit
for each Et in which for every i and t  t(i), u(qt (i))  u(qceeit (i))! 0.
Corollary 1 (Nearly-optimal-choice CEEI Convergence) Let Et = (It; t; X ; St; vt); t =
1; 2; ::: be a converging sequence of "t dense economies with full-support dense
limit economy E = (I; ;X ; S; v), and let us have a sequence of corresponding
e¢ cient and envy-free assignment proles qt that payo¤-converges to q, an
e¢ cient and envy-free assignment prole corresponding to E. Then there is
a sequence t ! 0 such that every qt is a t optimal-choice CEEI outcome for
its corresponding economy Et.
Proof: The assignment prole q is an e¢ cient and envy-free assignment prole
corresponding to E, a full-support economy. By Ashlagi and Shi (2015), it can
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be supported by a CEEI with prices p and the same budget w for every agent
i 2 I. Now we use a consistency property of competitive equilibria. For each t; let
qceeit : It ! jXj 1 be equal to q with domain It: qceeit (i) = q(i) for every i 2 It. Let
t =
R
It
qceeit (i)dt+ [S  
R
I
q(i)d]. (The latter component of the sum is the possible
excess supply in the limit economy). It is clear that qceeit is a CEEI assignment
prole corresponding to Et = (It; t; X ;t; vt) with the same prices p and the same
budget w for every agent i 2 It. Moreover Et ! E, thus t   St ! 0. Since qt
payo¤-converges to q and qceeit is equal to q with domain It, we conclude that
u(qt (i))   u(qceeit (i)) ! 0. This last statement directly proves the corollary, since qt
is a nearly-optimal choice prole under prices p and identical budget w for every
agent and for every economy Et. QED
A proper payo¤ convergence without trembling supplies needs that the set of
payo¤ vectors obtained under CEEI be lower hemicontinuous in t, for every t. In
that case, since t   St ! 0, for each su¢ ciently high value of t a CEEI under St
would exist with payo¤s close to those under t, which in turn approach those of
the converging sequence of e¢ cient and envy-free assignment proles. However,
this condition does not always hold.
Remark 1 (Discontinuity of Pseudomarket Equilibria) There is a nite economy
E = (I; ; X ; S; v) such that the set of CEEI price and income vectors is not
singleton nor lower hemicontinuous in S. Moreover, the corresponding set of
payo¤ proles does not have any of these properties either.
Proof: Let X = fx; y; zg; and let I = fi1; i2; i3g (each element with mass 1/3).
Supply is S = (5=9; 2=9; 2=9). Valuations are v(i1) = (1; 0; 1   "), v(i2) = (1; 1   "; 0),
v(i3) = (1; 1=2; 0), where " is a small positive number.
For the easiness of exposition and only for this proof, we normalize all incomes
to 1 instead of normalizing the highest price, which may now be higher than one.
The lowest price is still normalized to zero. Uniqueness and lower hemicontinu-
ity (as well as the lack of them) are preserved when we return to the original
normalization.
Non-uniqueness.- The following are equilibrium price vectors: p = (3=2; 3=4; 0),
and p0 = (3=2; 0; 3=4). Corresponding assignments are q(i1) = q(i3) = (2=3; 0; 1=3) and
q(i2) = (1=3; 2=3; 0), under p, and q0(i1) = (1=3; 0; 2=3) and q0(i2) = q0(i3) = (2=3; 1=3; 0),
under p0. It is clear that both assignment proles are feasible. It is also easy
to check that agents obtain di¤erent payo¤s depending on the equilibrium price
vector. There are no other equilibria.
No lower hemicontinuity.- Consider the vector p and notice that i3 is indi¤erent
between her assignment and q(i2). Now let us marginally increase supply for object
z, and both the other objects marginally decrease their supplies in order to make
overall supply add up to 1. Any valid marginal variation around p involves pz = 0
due to our normalization. In order to increase demand for z, a marginal increase
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of px (say "x) is necessary (for agents who spend their budgets on objects x and z
only, higher price of x forces them to buy a bundle with a higher share of z). Since
supply for object y has been reduced and equilibrium requires lower demand of
it, a marginal decrease of py (which we call "y) is necessary (for agents who spend
their budgets on objects x and y only, lower price of y allows to buy a bundle with
a lower share of y). But then, the increase of px jointly with the decrease of py
make i3s optimal choice jump to a point close to q(i2). Indeed, i3s payo¤ from
spending her budget on objects x and y is
1  (py   "y)
(px + "x)  (py   "y) +
(px + "x)  1
(px + "x)  (py   "y)  1=2 =
1=2 + "x=2 + "y
3=4 + "x + "y
while her payo¤ from spending her budget on objects x and z is
1
px + "x
=
1
3=2 + "x
It is mechanical to check that for any "x; "y > 0 the former expression is higher
than the latter expression. Therefore, i3s demand for object z decreases from 1/3
to zero. This breaks any possible equilibrium with prices around p when S is
marginally modied in the way mentioned before. Indeed the equilibrium is now
unique with some price vector close to p0, thus payo¤s also non-marginally di¤er
from those under S and p: QED
A pseudomarket equilibrium could just vanish, not only vary, with a small
variation of supplies. This happens because an a¤ordable good (one of which a
sure copy can be bought) could behave as a Gi¤en good, an issue rst pointed
out by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979). In our counterexample we observe that, in
order to decrease the demand for good y; we actually have to decrease its price. But
this might backre because it makes a bundle containing positive probabilities for
y more attractive (as indeed happens in the counterexample.) Hence the tremble of
supplies we use in Proposition 1 cannot be left aside. Payo¤ convergence cannot be
proved using this strategy (that is, trembling supplies and then invoking continuity
of CEEI with respect to the supply vector).
5 Conclusions
We show that the relation between large no-transfer assignment markets and their
continuum-agent models has to be taken with care. The problems are driven by
the inherent failure of local non-satiation in such markets. By showing that the
class of mechanisms that are fair and e¢ cient (or symmetric, incentive-compatible,
and e¢ cient) in large nite markets is larger than CEEI, our note also poses the
question what non-CEEI mechanisms satisfy these standard requirements.
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